SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
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COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA)
Represented by its President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 155336 Present: PUNO, Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., TINGA,
and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the
Decision dated
A Motion for
Reconsideration[3]
was consequently filed by the respondent to which petitioner filed an
Opposition.[4]
In its Motion, respondent
prays in the main that this Court reconsiders its ruling that respondent is not
among the constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy.
To recall, the facts[5]
of the case are as follows:
On
1. Organizational
Structure. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective
appropriations as authorized in this Act, the
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of
their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in
their personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer
of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED,
That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be
granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing
laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their
respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be
in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.
2. Use of
Savings. The Constitutional Commissions
and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in
their respective appropriations for: (a) printing and/or publication of
decisions, resolutions, and training information materials; (b) repair,
maintenance and improvement of central and regional offices, facilities and
equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d)
necessary expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual employees;
(e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable
representation and transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and employees as may be
authorized by law; and (f) other
official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied)
on the strength of this special provisions, the
Commission on Human Rights [or CHR], through its then Chairperson Aurora P.
Navarette-Recińa and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras,
Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on
WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522
has provided special provisions applicable to all Constitutional Offices
enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on organizational structures and
authorizes the same to formulate and implement the organizational structures of
their respective offices to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and
other benefits of their respective personnel and whenever public interest so
requires, make adjustments in the personnel services itemization including, but
not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their
respective offices: PROVIDED,
That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization
or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpanded
balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices;
Whereas, the Commission on Human Rights is a
member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the upgrading
and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from savings under
Personal Services to support the implementation of this resolution effective
Calendar Year 1998;
Let the Human Resources Development
Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary Notice of Salary Adjustment and other
appropriate documents to implement this resolution; x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of
ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with
Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with
Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office
of the Commissioners.
On
x x x x
To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR,
in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount
generated from savings under Personnel Services.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated
The CHR forwarded said staffing
modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and Management
[DBM] with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied
the request on the following justification:
. . .
Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it effectively involved the elevation of
the field units from divisions to services.
The present proposal seeks further to upgrade
the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a
bureau or regional office, a level even higher than the one previously denied.
The request to upgrade the three (3)
positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office
in effect would elevate the services to Office and change the context from
support to substantive without actual change in functions.
In the absence of a specific provision of law
which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a
bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we reiterate our
previous stand denying the upgrading of the twelve (12) positions of Attorney
VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations
Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the
Central Office.
As represented, President Ramos then issued a
Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General
Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational
unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or
directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office
and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation.
Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA
No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization Law, the
Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and administer a
unified compensation and position classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group
does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such
authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the
Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA
6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on
the matter. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the
proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999 recommended to the CSC-Central Office
that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the
plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile,
the officers of petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association
[CHREA], in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested
the CSC-Central office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying
that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to
evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation
of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request
in a Resolution dated
WHEREFORE,
the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones, George
Q. Dumlao [and], Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.
CHREA filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on
Given
the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner CHREA
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of
CHR’s fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision
provides:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED and the questioned Civil
Service Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated
Unfazed, the petitioner
elevated its case to this Court and successfully obtained the favorable action
in its Decision dated
I. WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY AND
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE
CONTENTION THAT THE CHR ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY.
II. WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN
STATING THAT THE SPECIAL PROVISION OF THE REP. ACT. (SIC) NO. 8522 DID NOT
SPECIFICALLY MENTION CHR AS AMONG THOSE OFFICES TO WHICH THE SPECIAL PROVISION
TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES APPLY, BUT MERELY STATES
ITS COVERAGE TO INCLUDE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND OFFICES ENJOYING FISCAL
AUTONOMY;
III. WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE CHR ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY A CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION IS
NONETHELESS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GENUS OF THE OFFICES ACCORDED FISCAL AUTONOMY
BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
IV. WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN
DECIDING TO REINSTATE THE RULING DATED 29 MARCH 1999 OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION – NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION;
V. WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN
DECIDING TO DISALLOW THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION NO. A98-047
DATED
Although this Court may have been
persuaded to take a second look at this case and partly modify the assailed
Decision, such modification shall not materially affect the dispositive portion
thereof.
As already settled in the assailed Decision of this
Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is
not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly
entitled “Constitutional Commissions,” identifies only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the
respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on
Human Rights, which reads that –
Sec. 17. (1)
There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on
Human Rights.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must be able to present constitutional
and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of
fiscal autonomy.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and
unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy
of the Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3, reproduced below –
Sec. 3.
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal autonomy
by the 1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section 5, a provision applied
in common to all constitutional commissions, to wit –
Sec. 5.
The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The Office of the Ombudsman
enjoys fiscal autonomy by virtue of Article XI, Section 14, of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that –
Sec. 14.
The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Each of the afore-quoted
provisions consists of two sentences stating that: (1) The government entity
shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth
paragraph of Article XIII, Section 17, according to which –
Sec. 17. x x x
x x x x
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the
Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.
As compared to the previously quoted Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX,
Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution on the
Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights
(CHR) evidently does not contain the first sentence on the express grant of
fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence on the automatic and
regular release of its approved annual appropriations. Question now arises as to the significance of
such a difference in the way the said provisions are worded.
To settle this ambiguity,
a perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) is
enlightening.
During the drafting of Article XIII, Section 17(4), of
the 1987 Constitution, the ConCom members had the following discussion[7] –
MR. BENGZON.
I have another paragraph, Madam President. This could be a separate section or another
paragraph depending on what the committee desires and what the Committee on
Style would wish: “THE COMMISSION SHALL ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY. THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED.” It will align this Human Rights Commission
with other commissions that we have created in the Constitution in order to
further insure the independence of the Human Rights Commission.
MR. DAVIDE.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
I introduced that particular amendment yesterday, but there was a
proposed modification presented by Commissioner Maambong to delete the first
sentence. I am in favor of the
modification presented earlier. So, may
I propose that the particular amendment should not carry the first sentence,
only the second sentence which reads: “THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF
THE COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED.”
MR. BENGZON.
Why do we want to delete the sentence which says “THE COMMISSION SHALL
ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY”?
MR. DAVIDE.
That would be a surplusage because the autonomy actually
intended is the automatic release of these appropriations.
MR. BENGZON.
If that is the case, then maybe we should also delete such sentence in
the other articles that we have approved.
I will just leave it up to the Committee on Style, as long as it is in
the record that that is the sense of the Commission, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does the committee say on this
point?
MR. SARMIENTO. Accepted, Madam President. We leave it to the Committee on Style, so
long as the intent is there.
MR. BENGZON.
In other words, what we are really saying is that if the Committee on
Style feels that it would be more elegant and it is a surplusage to include the
first sentence, then so be it as long as it is recorded in the Journal that it
is the sense of the Commission that the Human Rights Commission will enjoy
fiscal autonomy.
MR. GUINGONA.
Madam President.
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA.
May I respectfully invite the attention of the honorable Commissioners
that there are two committees that are tasked with the same work and,
therefore, reference can be made not only to the Committee on Style but also to
the Sponsorship Committee.
Thank you, Madam President.
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD.
Maybe we should just say that the minimum condition that the committee
agrees to is: “THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED.”
That is a minimum condition and we just allow the committees to add the
first sentence if they wish. But with
the second sentence, the sense is already there.
MR. BENGZON.
No problem, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. This was taken up yesterday.
MR. BENGZON.
But it was deferred, I understand, Madam President. So if we approve this now, then it will be
firmly included.
THE PRESIDENT. So, will the Commissioner please read it now
as it is?
MR. BENGZON.
I will read the amendment as accepted.
“THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED.”
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to this proposed
amendment which has been accepted by the committee?
MR. PADILLA.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA.
The wording reminds me of the provisions under the judiciary and the
constitutional commissions. Is the
intention to elevate the position of this proposed commission which is only
investigative and recommendatory to the high dignity of a constitutional
commission, as well as the independence of the judiciary, by making a positive
statement in the Constitution that its appropriation shall be released
automatically and so forth? It seems
that we are complicating and also reiterating several provisions that would
make our Constitution not only too long but too complicated. I wonder if that is the purpose because even
other bodies with semi-judicial functions do not enjoy such kind of
constitutional guarantee. It is just an
inquiry.
MR. BENGZON.
It is not so much the fact that we want to elevate this into a
constitutional commission as it is more of an insurance that the independence
of the Human Rights Commission, even though it is not considered as a
constitutional commission as contemplated and as compared to the Civil Service
Commission, the COMELEC and COA, is maintained.
And this is as elegant as the other sentences. So, we submit the same to the body.
MR. SARMIENTO. The proposed amendment has been accepted by
the committee, but we have this objection from Commissioner Padilla. So, may we throw the issue to the body?
MR. GUINGONA.
Madam President, just for clarification.
Does the amendment of the honorable Commissioner Bengzon refer only to
the release? I was thinking that
although I am very, very strongly in favor of this commission and would give it
one of the top priorities, there are other top priorities that we may want to
address ourselves to. For example, in
the Committee on Human Resources, we would like to give top priority to
education; therefore, if this does not refer only to an automatic and regular
release but would refer to the matter of priorities in the preparation of the
budget, then I am afraid that we might already be curtailing too much the
discretion on the part of both the legislature and the executive to determine
the priorities that should be given at a given time.
MR. BENGZON.
Madam President, the sentence means what it says and it is
clear.
THE PRESIDENT. Will the Commissioner please read.
MR. BENGZON.
It only refers to the release which should be automatic and
regular.
THE PRESIDENT. Please state it again so that we will be
clarified before we take a vote.
MR. GUINGONA.
Thank you, Madam President.
MR. BENGZON.
It will read: “THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED.”
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of this particular
section, please raise their hand. (Several
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are
against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
As many as are
abstaining, please raise their hand. (Two
Members raised their hand.)
The results show 26
votes in favor, 4 against and 2 abstentions; the amendment is approved. (Emphases
supplied.)
The respondent relies on the
statement of then Constitutional Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that the
first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy to the respondent was
deleted from Article XIII, Section 17(4) of the 1987 Constitution because it
was a surplusage. Respondent posits that
the second sentence, directing the automatic and regular release of its
approved annual appropriations, has the same essence as the express grant of
fiscal autonomy, thus rendering the first sentence redundant and
unnecessary.
This Court, however, believes
otherwise. The statement of then
Constitutional Commissioner Davide should be read in full. Referring to the deletion of the first
sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, he explained that the first
sentence “would be a surplusage because the autonomy actually intended
is the automatic release of these appropriations.[8]”
(Emphasis supplied.)
Even in the latter discussion between
Constitutional Commissioners Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and Serafin V.C. Guingona,
wherein Constitutional Commissioner Guingona asked for clarification whether
respondent shall also be extended priorities in the preparation of the national
budget, Constitutional Commissioner Bengzon replied that “x x x the sentence
means what it says and it is clear,”[9]
and that “[i]t only refers to the release which should be automatic and
regular.”[10]
Therefore, after reviewing the
deliberations of the ConCom on Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987
Constitution, in its entirety, not just bits and pieces thereof, this Court is
convinced that the ConCom had intended to grant to the respondent the privilege
of having its approved annual appropriations automatically and regularly
released, but nothing more. While it may
be conceded that the automatic and regular release of approved annual
appropriations is an aspect of fiscal autonomy, it is just one of many others.
This Court has already defined the
scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon,[11]
as follows –
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the
government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control. x x x
The foregoing excerpt sufficiently elucidates that the grant of fiscal
autonomy is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of
approved annual appropriations of the government entity. It is also worth stressing herein that in Bengzon
v. Drilon, this Court, ruling En Banc, only recognized the fiscal
autonomy of the Judiciary; the constitutional commissions, namely, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections;
and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Respondent is conspicuously left out of the enumeration.
Moreover, the ConCom had
the following deliberations[12]
on the meaning of the fiscal autonomy extended to the constitutional
commissions in what is to become later Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the
1987 Constitution –
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treńas). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
This morning, I asked the proponent of this
resolution what is included in the term “fiscal autonomy.” The answer I got is that it is for the
automatic release of the budget. I
propose that the sentence “The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy” be
deleted but the second sentence shall remain.
The reason is that it is already redundant. Fiscal autonomy means the automatic release
of appropriations.
MR. MONSOD.
Mr. Presiding Officer, may we answer the honorable Commissioner.
I think the answer of the Chairman of our
Committee this morning was that it would involve the automatic and regular
release of the funds once approved. In
addition, we are suggesting that fiscal autonomy include the nonimposition of
any other procedures, for example, a preaudit system in the commissions or
bodies that enjoy fiscal autonomy. So,
actually, the definition of fiscal autonomy would be a bit broader than just
the automatic release.
MR. DE CASTRO. Does the Commissioner mean that these
commissions will not be subjected to preaudit?
MR. MONSOD.
Our proposal actually in the provisions on the Commission on Audit is
that they be subjected to comprehensive postaudit procedures and where their
internal control system is inadequate, in the opinion of the Commission on
Audit, then the commission may also take such measures as are necessary to
correct the inadequacies which might include special preaudit systems.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treńas). The Chair understands, therefore, that the
proposed amendment of Commissioner de Castro is not acceptable to the
Committee?
MR. DE CASTRO. Not yet, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we
are still on the answer to me this morning, which stated – the record will bear
me out – that fiscal autonomy means the automatic release of
appropriations. It means the automatic
release and nothing more. We were in the
same Committee and when we asked the COA about this, they insisted that there
must be preaudit. If fiscal autonomy
means that there will be no preaudit, I do not know what will happen to this.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treńas). So, what is the stand of the Committee
insofar as the proposed amendment of Commissioner de Castro is concerned?
MR. DE CASTRO. May I just say one sentence, Mr. Presiding
Officer? If the Committee’s stand is
that fiscal autonomy means the automatic release of the appropriations, then I say
that the first sentence – “The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy” -- should be deleted because it is a
repetition of the second sentence.
Thank you.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, the position of the
Committee is that fiscal autonomy may include other things than just the
automatic and regular release of the funds.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treńas). With that explanation, what is the pleasure
of Commissioner de Castro? Does he
insist on his amendment?
MR. DE CASTRO. Is the Chairman changing his answer from this
morning’s question? If he does, I will
ask some more questions about fiscal autonomy.
MR. MONSOD.
Mr. Presiding Officer, I think at the beginning of this exchange, we
already told the honorable Commissioner that the Chairman of the Committee had
not meant to make it an all-inclusive definition. And if he was misled into thinking of another
meaning, we apologize for it. But
our position is that fiscal autonomy would include other rights than just
merely automatic and regular disbursement.
MR. DE CASTRO. Does it include exception from preaudit?
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, it would include the imposition of certain preaudit requirements
for release, because if the preaudit requirements are inserted into the process
of release, it would defeat the objective of automatic and regular release.
Based on the preceding exchange, it can be derived
that the first sentence of Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the 1987
Constitution, expressly granting fiscal autonomy to constitutional commissions,
does not have the same meaning as the second sentence, directing the automatic
and regular release of their approved annual appropriations, hence, the
resistance of Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod to the suggested
amendment of Constitutional Commissioner Crispino M. De Castro to just delete
the first sentence.
In
addition, the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), to which respondent
avers membership, defined the term “fiscal autonomy” in its Joint Resolution
No. 49, dated
IV. Definition
of Terms:
1. Fiscal Autonomy shall mean independence or
freedom regarding financial matters from outside control and is characterized
by self direction or self determination. It does not mean mere automatic and regular
release of approved appropriations to agencies vested with such
power in a very real sense, the fiscal autonomy contemplated in the
constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons, after the release
of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy encompasses,
among others, budget preparation and implementation, flexibility in fund
utilization of approved appropriations, use of savings and disposition of
receipts. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
While the assailed Decision
and the present Resolution may render the status of respondent’s membership in
CFAG uncertain, the then Chairperson of respondent, Aurora P. Navarrete-Recina,
duly signed CFAG Joint Resolution No. 49, and respondent should be held bound
by the definition of fiscal autonomy therein.
CFAG Joint Resolution No. 49 categorically declares that fiscal autonomy
means more than just the automatic and regular release of approved
appropriation, and also encompasses, among other things: (1) budget preparation
and implementation; (2) flexibility in fund utilization of approved
appropriations; and (3) use of savings and disposition of receipts. Having agreed to such a definition of fiscal
autonomy, respondent has done a complete turn-about herein and is now contradicting
itself by arguing that the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations is already tantamount to fiscal autonomy.
Consequently,
this Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain
degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal
autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary,
constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative herein is the rule of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others.[13] The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature (or in this case, the ConCom) would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute (or the Constitution) had the intention not been to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[14]
The
provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, on the fiscal autonomy of constitutional commissions, the Office
of the Ombudsman, and the respondent, merely follow the phraseology used in the
corresponding provisions of the 1987 Constitution, thus –
Book II, Chapter 5, Section
26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. The approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle
B, Section 4. Fiscal Autonomy. –
The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle
A, Section 6. Annual
Appropriations. – The approved
annual appropriations of the Commission on Human Rights shall be automatically
and regularly released.
While the Administrative Code of 1987
has no reference to the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, it does have
provisions on the fiscal autonomy of the constitutional commissions and the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is very
interesting to note that while Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26 (on
constitutional commissions) and Book V, Title 2, Subtitle B, Section 4 (on the
Office of the Ombudsman) of the Code are entitled “Fiscal Autonomy,” Book V,
Title 2, Subtitle A, Section 6 (on respondent) bears the title “Annual
Appropriations.” Further, the provisions
on the constitutional commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman in the
Administrative Code of 1987, just like in the 1987 Constitution, are composed
of two sentences: (1) The government
entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) Its approved annual appropriation
shall be automatically and regularly released.
The provision on respondent in the same Code is limited only to the
second sentence.
Respondent
asserts that it is granted fiscal autonomy by Book VI, Chapter 1, Section 1,
paragraph 9, of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads –
SEC. 1.
Constitutional Policies on the Budget. –
x x x x
(9) Fiscal autonomy shall be enjoyed by the
Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, Office of the Ombudsman, Local
Government and Commission on Human Rights.
As its title suggests, the
afore-cited provision is supposed to merely re-state the policies on budget as
declared by the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, cannot grant or extend to the
respondent a privilege not found in the 1987 Constitution. Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987,
under which the said provision is found, pertains to National Government
Budgeting. Respondent may have been
included in the enumeration of fiscally autonomous government entities because
it does enjoy an aspect of fiscal autonomy, that of the automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations from the national budget. The general declaration of fiscal autonomy of
the respondent in Section 1, paragraph 9, of Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 on National Government Budgeting, must be qualified and limited by
Section 6 of Book V, Title II, Subtitle A of the same Code specifically
pertaining to respondent. It should be
borne in mind that the general rule is that a word, phrase or provision should
not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in relation to other
provisions of the law.[15]
To reiterate, under the Constitution,
as well as the Administrative Code of 1987, respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy
only to the extent that its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released, but nothing more.
On the main issue of whether or not
the approval by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is a condition
precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR, this Court staunchly holds that
as prescinding from the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in
length in the assailed Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought
prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government.
Regardless of whether or not
respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that
the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all
the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. This Court is of the same mind with the DBM[16]
on its standpoint, thus –
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group
does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM.
While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement
the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
To drive home this point, in the special
provision covering the Judiciary as quoted above, the judiciary was not vested with the power to formulate and
implement organizational structures beyond
the salary rates, allowances and other benefits under the compensation
standardization laws. Stated
differently, although the Judiciary is allowed to reorganize, any such
reorganization must, nevertheless, be in strict adherence to the Salary
Standardization Law. Ergo, any reorganization therein must be
with the conformity of the DBM inasmuch as it is the government arm tasked by
law to implement the Salary Standardization Law.
In Republic
Act No. 9227, or “An Act Granting
Additional Compensation in the Form of Special Allowances for Justices, Judges
and All Other Positions in the Judiciary with the Equivalent Rank of Justices
of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the Regional Trial Court, and for Other
Purposes,” the grant of Special Allowances to members of the Judiciary did
not operate to exempt members thereof from the Salary Standardization Law. In Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9227, the
Supreme Court and the DBM were specifically tasked to issue the necessary
guidelines for the proper implementation of this Act in respect to funds coming
from the National Treasury.[17] Resultantly, the Supreme Court and the DBM
issued Joint Circular No. 2004-1 on
If the judiciary,
a co-equal branch of government, which was expressly granted by the
Constitution with fiscal autonomy, is required to conform to the Salary
Standardization Law and is subject to the scrutiny of the DBM, sagaciously, the
respondent cannot be deemed to enjoy a better position than the Judiciary. The respondent must, likewise, toe the line.
This Court shall no longer belabor
the point it has already delved upon in length in its Decision that Congress
has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization
Law, which power is part of the system of checks and balances or system of
restraints in the Philippine government.
This Court, thus, reiterates the point that the DBM’s exercise of such
authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the 1987
Constitution, the paramount law of the land; the Salary Standardization Law;
and the Administrative Code of 1987.
In line with its role to breathe life
into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of “providing equal pay
for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of
the positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after
a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed
by the respondent lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of
the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA), FY 1998, which
the respondent heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme,
explicitly provides that “no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
provided by law or directed by the President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law
authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs
Office in the CHR. Anent respondent’s
proposal to upgrade twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-28 to Director IV,
SG-28, and three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in
its Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context
from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law’s
designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system,
is beyond cavil. The interpretation of
an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,[18]
the Court echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise
on matters affecting the nation’s coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the
President’s alter ego, knows from
where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects
of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular
and in the entire government in general.
As the final thrust, given this
Court’s previous pronouncement in the present Resolution that the fiscal
autonomy granted to the respondent by the 1987 Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987 shall be limited only to the automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations, respondent is precluded from
invoking the Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy in the 1998 GAA.
The said Special Provisions read –
Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy
1. Organization Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding
and within the limits of their respective appropriations as authorized in this
Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make
adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to,
the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices:
PROVIDED, That the officers and employees whose positions are affected by such
reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from
any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective
offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices
enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in their
respective appropriations for; (a) printing and/or publication of decisions,
resolutions, and training information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and
improvement of central and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary expenses
for the employment or temporary, contractual and casual employees; (e) payment
of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and
transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and
employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject
to accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
It is unequivocal that the
afore-quoted Special Provisions of the 1998 GAA refer to the broad and
extensive concept of fiscal autonomy.
They already go beyond ensuring the automatic and regular release of the
approved annual appropriations, but already enumerate the ways by which the
named government entities can use their appropriations to effect changes in
their organizational structure and their savings for certain official purposes. Even assuming arguendo that the said
Special Provisions are applicable to respondent, it should be noted that the
last sentence in paragraph 1 qualifies the power of a fiscally autonomous
government entity to formulate and implement changes in its organizational
structure so that, “x x x the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with
salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.” And, as
exhaustively expounded in the assailed Decision and the herein Resolution, only
the DBM has the authority and the technical expertise to determine compliance
by respondent to the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of this Court dated 25 November 2004 is hereby MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR
as a constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in
the sense that it is entitled to the automatic and regular release of its
approved annual appropriations; nonetheless, it is still required to conform to
the Salary Standardization Law.
Accordingly, its entire reclassification scheme remains subject to the
approval of the DBM. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
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I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S.
PUNO Associate Justice Chairman, Second Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Minita
V. Chico-Nazario with Acting Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Associate Justices
Ma. Alicia
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Record of Constitutional Commission, Vol. IV, pp. 10-12 (
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] G.R. No. 103524,
[12] Record
of Constitutional Commission, vol. i, pp. 559-560 (
[13] Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 222
(2003). See Centeno v.
Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092,
[14] Commissioner of Customs v. Court of
Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 48886-88,
[15] Supra note 12 at 191.
[16] Letter, dated
[17] Sec. 7. Issuance of Implementing Guidelines. – The Supreme Court and the Department of Budget and Management shall issue the necessary guidelines for the proper implementation of this Act in respect to funds coming from the National Treasury within ninety (90) days from approval hereof.
[18] G.R.
No. 113079,